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Section 414 of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States' (the Restatement) represents a formidable effort to reduce to a
single statement of general principle the law on prescriptive jurisdiction2 with
respect to the activities of foreign branches and subsidiaries. In matters involving
U.S. national security and foreign policy, however, it is fair to question whether
section 414 represents law or aspiration and whether, as aspiration, it provides a
principled basis for the substitution of judicial judgments for those of the legis-
lative or executive branches.
*Partner, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, Washington, D.C. The author acknowledges with
gratitude the invaluable collaboration of Christopher F. D. Ryder and the tireless production assis-
tance of Kim Martines, both also of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy.
1. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 414 (1987)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
2. According to the Restatement, prescriptive jurisdiction, or jurisdiction to prescribe, consists
of the authority of a state "to make its law applicable to the activities, relations, or status of persons,
or the interests of persons in things, whether by legislation, by executive act or order, by adminis-
trative rule or regulation, or by determination of a court." Id. § 401(a). The Restatement, in contrast
to the previous revision, distinguishes "jurisdiction to prescribe" from "jurisdiction to adjudicate"
and "jurisdiction to enforce." See id. § 401(b)-(c), pt. IV introductory note at 231, reporters' note
2 at 232.
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According to the Restatement, section 414's rules on prescriptive jurisdiction
"reflect development in the law as given effect by United States courts." 3
However true that may be generally, in the national security and foreign policy
context at least, U.S. courts typically have been reluctant to review executive or
legislative prescriptions. 4 Under the circumstances, there is little reason to expect
that the judiciary would feel constrained, in the national security and foreign
policy sphere, by precedent or otherwise, to apply section 414 to invalidate
executive or legislative efforts to apply U.S. law extraterritorially. Should the
judiciary attempt to do so, it would undoubtedly discover that section 414 would
impose rules of decision that the courts are not uniquely competent to apply.
The American Law Institute characterizes the Restatement as a whole as its
"opinion ...as to the rules that an impartial tribunal would apply if charged
with deciding a controversy in accordance with international law." 5 Yet, in the
national security and foreign policy sphere, there is little to suggest that a U.S.
court would regard itself more competent than the legislature or the executive to
apply the principles set forth in section 414. Indeed, no U.S. court appears ever
to have thought it appropriate to invalidate an exercise of U.S. extraterritorial
jurisdiction in the national security and foreign policy arena on such grounds. 6
The purpose of this article is to illustrate some of the conceptual and inter-
pretational issues that section 414 presents and some of the issues that courts
might confront in applying the principles embodied in section 414 to executive
or legislative exercises of extraterritorial jurisdiction in the national security and
foreign policy arena. As illustrated below, Congress and the executive branch on
numerous occasions have drawn detailed and finely honed extraterritorial juris-
dictional lines in promulgating laws and regulations to advance or protect U.S.
national security and foreign policy interests. Although occasionally controver-
sial and frequently lacking optimal precision, these laws and regulations reflect
such subjective judgments about the national interest and conflicts with other
nations that there is little or no principled basis for preferring the calculus of the
judiciary in this regard to that of the legislative or executive branches, absent a
mandate for the judiciary to be the ultimate arbiter of matters of extraterritorial
jurisdiction involving the foreign relations of the United States.
3. Id. pt. IV introductory note at 231.
4. This "classical deference to the political branches in matters of foreign policy," Regan v. Wald,
468 U.S. 222, 242 (1984), was perhaps most broadly stated in Justice Sutherland's opinion in United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). See also Louis HENriN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND THE CONSTITrION 206-07 (1972) ("But foreign affairs make a difference. The courts are less
willing than elsewhere to curb the political branches and have even developed special doctrines of
deference to them."); See also generally id. at 205-24. The appropriateness of such subservience has
been questioned from both historical and policy perspectives. See, e.g., Charles A. Lofgren, United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1 (1973);
Jonathan 1. Charney, Judicial Deference in Foreign Relations, 83 Am. J. INT'L L. 805 (1989).
5. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note I, at 3.
6. See HENKIN, supra note 4, at 208 & n.* (no Supreme Court case invalidating foreign affairs
statute, treaty, or act as beyond power of federal government).
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Such a mandate does not currently exist. As a consequence, while section 414
embodies noble principles, its broad injunctions serve mainly to amplify the
precept of "reasonableness" that the Restatement adopts as a fundamental ju-
risdictional principle. 7 In the national security and foreign relations sphere, the
presumption of reasonableness implicit in traditional judicial deference to legis-
lative and executive branch decisions provides little basis for expecting vigor-
ously independent judicial scrutiny of legislative and executive extraterritorial
prescriptions under section 414's banner.
8
I. The Structure of the Rule
Section 414 of the Restatement provides as follows:
(1) Subject to §§ 4039 and 441,10 a state may exercise jurisdiction to prescribe for
limited purposes with respect to activities of foreign branches of corporations organized
under its laws.
7. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, pt. IV, ch. 1, subch. A, introductory note at 237.
8. The Restatement (Third) acknowledges that § 414 reflects "greater controversy and less
consensus" than other sections. Id. pt. IV, ch. 1, subch. B, introductory note at 258.
9. It reads in full:
§ 403. Limitations on Jurisdiction to Prescribe
(1) Even when one of the bases for jurisdiction under § 402 is present, a state may not exercise jurisdiction to
prescribe law with respect to a person or activity having connections with another state when the exercise of such
jurisdiction is unreasonable.
(2) Whether exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is unreasonable is determined by evaluating all
relevant factors, including, where appropriate:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the extent to which the activity takes place
within the territory, or has a substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the regulating state and the
person principally responsible for the activity to be regulated, or between the state and those whom the
regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the regulating state, the extent
to which other states regulate such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is
generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
(3) When it would not be unreasonable for each of two states to exercise jurisdiction over a person or activity,
but the prescriptions by the two states are in conflict, each state has an obligation to evaluate its own as well as
the other state's interest in exercising jurisdiction, in light of all the relevant factors in Subsection (2); a state should
defer to the other state if that state's interest is clearly greater.
Section 402 of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) provides as follows:
§ 402. Bases of Jurisdiction to Prescribe
Subject to § 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to
(1) (a) conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its territory;
(b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its territory;
(c) conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory;
(2) the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as well as within its territory; and
(3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals that is directed against the security of the state
or against a limited class of other state interests.
10. It reads in full:
§ 441. Foreign State Compulsion
(1) In general, a state may not require a person
(a) to do an act in another state that is prohibited by the law of that state or by the law of the state of which
he is a national; or
(b) to refrain from doing an act in another state that is required by the law of that state or by the law of the
state of which he is a national.
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(2) A state may not ordinarily regulate activities of corporations organized under the
laws of a foreign state on the basis that they are owned or controlled by nationals of the
regulating state. However, under § 403 and subject to § 441, it may not be unreasonable
for a state to exercise jurisdiction for limited purposes with respect to activities of
affiliated foreign entities
(a) by direction to the parent corporation in respect of such matters as uniform
accounting, disclosure to investors, or preparation of consolidated tax returns of
multinational enterprises; or
(b) by direction to either the parent or the subsidiary in exceptional cases, depending
on all relevant factors, including the extent to which
(i) the regulation is essential to implementation of a program to further a major
national interest of the state exercising jurisdiction;
(ii) the national program of which the regulation is a part can be carried out
effectively only if it is applied also to foreign subsidiaries;
(iii) the regulation conflicts or is likely to conflict with the law or policy of the
state where the subsidiary is established.
(c) In the exceptional cases referred to in paragraph (b), the burden of establishing
reasonableness is heavier when the direction is issued to the foreign subsidiary
than when it is issued to the parent corporation. (Emphasis added.)
Embraced within this rule is a series of elements whose contour and meaning
inevitably will vary with the eye and perspective of the beholder.
A. DISTINCTION BETWEEN FOREIGN
BRANCHES AND SUBSIDIARIES
One of the first things to note about section 414 is the difference in approach
to jurisdiction with respect to foreign branches, on the one hand, and foreign
subsidiaries on the other. Section 414(1) concerns itself exclusively with foreign
branches as distinct from foreign subsidiaries."1  As noted, it provides that,
subject to limitations based on reasonableness and an exception for foreign state
compulsion, a state may exercise prescriptive jurisdiction for "limited purposes
only" with respect to foreign branches of corporations organized under its laws.
That is the totality of the rule with respect to foreign branches. The Restatement
is silent as to what those limited purposes might be. Section 414 implies, how-
ever, that they might be different from the purposes for which jurisdiction over
(2) In general, a state may require a person of foreign nationality
(a) to do an act in that state even if it is prohibited by the law of the state of which he is a national; or
(b) to refrain from doing an act in that state even if it is required by the law of the state of which he is a
national.
11. The text of § 414(2) actually refers to "affiliated foreign entities" as counterparts to
branches, rather than explicitly referring to "subsidiaries," even though (1) the title of the entire
section refers to "foreign branches and subsidiaries," (2) § 414(2) refers to "corporations organized
under the laws of a foreign state" and (3) subsections (b) and (c) refer exclusively to subsidiaries as
the counterparts to branches, while subsection (a) refers to parent corporations. The only possible
conclusion is that the reference to "affiliated foreign entities" in § 414(2) is merely an inexact
paraphrase of "foreign subsidiaries" and not an allusion to some entities other than corporations that
might stand in some relation to a "parent" corporation other than that of a foreign subsidiary. Id. §
414(2).
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foreign subsidiaries is permissible under section 414(2), for otherwise there
would be no need for a separate subsection for branches.
Section 414(1)'s comparative liberality with respect to foreign branches re-
flects the Restatement's precept that foreign branches, as distinct from foreign
subsidiaries, are largely extensions of the home state entity. As a consequence,
suggests section 414's comment a, the exercise of jurisdiction by the "parent
company's' home state over that company's foreign branches1 2 "is viewed with
less concern by host states than the exercise of jurisdiction by the state of a parent
company over foreign subsidiaries of the company." 13 The commentators state
no empirical basis for that proposition, but rather seem to justify it on the ground
that the branch lacks a separate juridical status. According to comment a, "[u]n-
like a foreign subsidiary, a foreign branch is not a distinct juridical entity."' 14
Why that difference should be controlling, however, is not clear. Bank regu-
lators, for example, typically treat domestic branches of foreign banks in ways
that are in many respects indistinguishable from the way they treat separately
incorporated subsidiaries.' 5 Interestingly, comment a betrays a degree of tenta-
tiveness about the significance of separate juridical status by its observation that
"the factor of separate incorporation in the host state being absent, the exercise
of jurisdiction by the state of the parent by analogy to the exercise of jurisdiction
under the nationality principle, § 402(2), 16 is not implausible."' 7 Lack of im-
plausibility, however, hardly seems a firm foundation for different jurisdictional
precepts.
Comment b goes on to state, "[t]he distinction between Subsection (1), deal-
ing with branches, and Subsection (2), dealing with separately incorporated
subsidiaries, reflects the view that, by incorporating in the host state, an enter-
12. The Restatement (Third) speaks of a "parent company" in relation to its foreign branches,
even though a branch typically is not thought of as having a juridical status separate and distinct from
the entity of which it is a part. For purposes of § 414(1), a branch is explicitly treated as having no
separate juridical status. Id. § 414 cmt. a. However much "parent company" terminology in relation
to branches might imply a degree of independence from the larger entity of which the branch is a part,
the Restatement hews to a more formalistic approach. See id. § 414 reporters' note 1. It also appears
to admit of no possible circumstance in which a foreign branch might be regulated as if it were a
subsidiary. Compare U.S. Commerce Department's Regulations on Restrictive Trade Practices or
Boycotts, 15 C.F.R. § 769.1(b)(1)(b) (1991) (treating "controlled in fact" foreign branches, sub-
sidiaries and other "permanent foreign establishments" interchangeably for purposes of extraterri-
torial jurisdiction).
13. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 414 cmt. a at 270.
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., id. § 414 reporter's note 6. Note that in the area of financial services regulation,
which involves transcendent considerations of host country regulation for the protection of domestic
interests, the formal distinction between branches and subsidiaries has been swept away with greatest
ease.
16. Id. § 402(2) provides that a state has jurisdiction, subject to § 403 (the "reasonableness
rule"), to prescribe law with respect to "the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals
outside as well as within its territory."
17. Id. § 414 cmt. a, at 270 (emphasis added).
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prise becomes legally more distant from the state of the parent corporation than
if it operates as a branch."' 8 Legal distance, arising from the fact of separate
incorporation, thus seems to be a separate justification under section 414 for
differentiating between foreign branches and subsidiaries.
When separate incorporation reflects nothing more than an effort to minimize
taxes and limit liability, however, it is not clear why incorporation in the host
state should alone give rise to a different rule about prescriptive jurisdiction.
Moreover, since ownership or control of a foreign subsidiary is a prerequisite to
the exercise of jurisdiction pursuant to section 414(2) in any event, both branches
and subsidiaries would appear to stand on an equal footing with respect to the
most salient apparent justification for the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction
in the national security and foreign policy sphere, namely, the ability of person-
nel in the home state to command or prohibit behavior abroad that is deemed
inimical to the national security or foreign policy interests of the home state.
Thus, the Restatement relies on a curious mixture of plausibility, formalistic
distance, and unsubstantiated indifference on the part of the host state as the
basis for a conceptually distinct treatment of branch and subsidiary activities
even though such activities may ultimately be subject to the same degree of
control by persons within the home state.
B. "LIMITED PURPOSES" WITH RESPECT TO BRANCHES
However sound a distinction between branches and subsidiaries might be for
purposes of a rule on prescriptive jurisdiction, as indicated, the Restatement
provides no guidance on what is embraced within the universe of "limited
purposes" for which foreign branch regulation is permissible. This omission is
in striking contrast to the Restatement's explicit articulation under section
414(2)(a) of various categories of "limited purposes" for which the exercise of
jurisdiction with respect to foreign subsidiaries is permissible. Since the explic-
itly delineated purposes for which foreign subsidiary regulation is permissible
under section 414(2)(a) would seem to constitute equally valid bases for the
regulation of foreign branches, it would appear that foreign branch regulation is
permissible at a minimum for the purposes set forth in section 414(2)(a), not-
withstanding section 414(l)'s silence on the matter.
C. "LIMITED PURPOSES" WITH RESPECT
TO FOREIGN SUBSIDIARIES;
DIRECTION TO THE PARENT
As noted, section 414(2)(a) provides that it "may not be unreasonable" for a
state to exercise jurisdiction "for limited purposes" with respect to the activities
of affiliated foreign entities "by direction to the parent corporation in respect of
18. Id. § 414 cmt. b, at 271 (emphasis added).
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such matters as uniform accounting, disclosure to investors, or preparation of
consolidated tax returns of multinational enterprises." 19 The exercise of expan-
sive jurisdiction in those instances is reasonable presumably because in these
matters there ordinarily would be no justification for divergent behavior between
a parent company and its foreign subsidiaries. Further, divergent behavior on the
part of the foreign subsidiary with respect to such matters might make informa-
tion provided by the parent to investors or regulatory authorities misleading or
impair the functioning of the public fisc.
20
For branches as well as subsidiaries, there would ordinarily be few, if any,
occasions for divergent behavior with respect to such matters. Consequently, the
exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction regarding such matters so far as branches are
concerned should also be encompassed by the "limited purposes" for which
section 414(1) permits the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction. With respect to
accounting, disclosure, and the preparation of tax returns, equivalent treatment
of foreign branches and subsidiaries seems justified, and it remains a curiosity
that section 414 is silent on such convergence.
D. THE EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION WITH
RESPECT TO FoREIGN SUBSIDIARIES;
DIRECTION TO THE FOREIGN SUBSIDIARY,
BUT ONLY IN "EXCEPTIONAL CASES"
Section 414(2)(b), as noted, provides that it "may not be unreasonable" for
a state to exercise jurisdiction "for limited purposes" with respect to the activ-
ities of affiliated foreign entities by direction to the foreign subsidiary as well as
the home state parent "in exceptional cases." 21 What constitutes an "excep-
tional case" is not defined. Instead, according to the Restatement, the reason-
ableness of a direction to a foreign subsidiary in exceptional cases would depend
on "all relevant factors," including the extent to which
(i) the regulation is essential to implementation of a program to further a major
national interest... ;
(ii) the national program of which the regulation is a part can be carried out effectively
only if it is applied also to foreign subsidiaries;
(iii) the regulation conflicts or is likely to conflict with the law or policy of the state
where the subsidiary is located. 22
19. Id. § 414(2)(a) (emphasis added).
20. In this respect, these limited purposes would seem to be comprehended entirely within those
set out as "exceptional cases" under § 414(2)(b).
21. Id. § 414(2)(b) (emphasis added).
22. Id. The identification of an exceptional case has one further step, for § 414(c) provides that
"[i]n the exceptional cases referred to in paragraph (b), the burden of establishing reasonableness is
heavier when the direction is issued to the foreign subsidiary than when it is issued to the parent
corporation." It is striking that the "heavier" burden is not quantified even to the extent of some
standard such as by a clear (or compelling or overwhelming) preponderance of the factors.
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Section 414(2)(b) is curiously drafted. By contrast to section 414(2)(a), which
is confined to mandates to the foreign subsidiary's domestic parent, section
414(2)(b) omits mention of the proper subjects of regulation. As indicated, the
"limited purposes" with which section 414(2)(a) is concerned pertain to such
matters as uniform accounting, disclosure to investors, and the preparation of
consolidated tax returns. By contrast, "limited purposes" for purposes of section
414(2)(b) are identified only by an admixture of goals, pragmatic considerations,
and limitations characterized as "factors" in section 414(2)(b)(i), (ii), and (iii).
The first of these pertains to whether a "major" national interest is involved
and whether the regulation is "essential" to implementation of that interest. The
second factor involves narrower considerations of effectiveness, that is, whether
direct regulation of the foreign subsidiary is "essential" to the ability of the
regulation to be carried out effectively. The third factor has nothing to do with the
first two. The consideration there is whether direct regulation will conflict with
the law or the policy of the state where the subsidiary is established. It is unclear
whether these are factors that limit the purposes for which jurisdiction may be
exercised under section 414(2)(b) or whether they are considerations to be ap-
plied once jurisdiction is deemed permissible within the general "limited pur-
poses" constraint. As a matter of drafting, the latter would appear to be the better
interpretation, but such an interpretation serves to emphasize the total absence of
substantive guidance as to what constitutes a limited purpose.
The factors that serve to limit the occasions in which direction to the foreign
subsidiary is permissible might be relevant to determining whether direct foreign
branch regulation is permissible under section 414(1) as well. Indeed, such
factors seem equally applicable to deciding whether regulation of a foreign
branch is permissible. It would seem odd, for example, to regard regulation of
a foreign branch as permissible in those instances where (i) such regulation is not
essential to implementation of a program to further a major national interest,
(ii) the national program of which the regulation is a part can be carried out
effectively even if it is not applied to the branch, or (iii) direct regulation of the
branch would conflict with the law or policy of the state where the branch is
located. Thus, it is hard to see how the limited purposes for which foreign branch
regulation is justified under section 414(1) can be any broader in scope than the
limited purposes for which direct regulation of a foreign subsidiary is justified
under section 414(2)(b). That being so, section 414's seemingly different treat-
ment of prescriptive jurisdiction with respect to foreign branches and foreign
subsidiaries may be more apparent than real.
II. Applying the Rule in Practice
Profound difficulties would confront the judiciary in attempting to determine
whether a statutory or regulatory mandate to a foreign subsidiary or to a domestic
corporation in respect of its foreign subsidiary met the requirements of section
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414(2)(b). A court would have to determine whether the mandate was for a "lim-
ited purpose," constituted an "exceptional case," and was "essential" to the
implementation of a program. It would also have to determine whether the pro-
gram to which the mandate related reflected a "major national interest" and could
be carried out effectively "only if it is applied also to foreign subsidiaries."
Even if a court could, with confidence, answer each of these questions affir-
matively, the exercise would not be complete. The court would then have to
determine whether the mandate or regulation "conflicts" with or is "likely to
conflict with" the "law" or "policy" of the subsidiary's host state. The Re-
statement does not specify what a court should do if it should find such an actual
or likely conflict. Does such a conflict make the home state's prescription un-
reasonable? How is the court to determine whether the political branches have
met the "heavier" burden of justification that applies under section 414(2)(c) to
directions issued to a foreign subsidiary as compared to directions issued to its
parent?
Unfortunately the Restatement provides no answers. Nor does it provide an
answer to the fundamental question of how or why judicial judgment might be
substituted for legislative or executive branch judgment with respect to such
questions. Traditional judicial deference to the political branches of government
with respect to regulatory programs with national security or foreign policy
underpinnings is undoubtedly reflective of the inherently political character of
answers to questions of the kind that inhere in a section 414 analysis.
The difficulties become clearer when one examines some of the situations in
which Congress and the executive branch have drawn complex prescriptive ju-
risdictional boundaries with respect to foreign subsidiaries and branches of U.S.
corporations in a variety of national security and foreign policy-based situations
over the years. Many of these either demonstrably are or would appear to be the
product of conscious determinations relating to the very kinds of issues that the
Restatement would call upon the judiciary to determine de novo.
A. THE FOREIGN BoYcoTt PROVISIONS OF
THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION AcT
The purpose of the foreign boycott provisions of the Export Administration
Act, 23 as implemented by the relevant Export Administration Regulations, 24 is to
prohibit any "United States person," with respect to an activity in "the interstate
or foreign commerce of the United States," from taking or agreeing to take
certain actions with intent to comply with, further, or support a boycott fostered
23. Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 8, 93 Stat. 503, 521-24 (codified
at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407 (1988)) (reenacting antiboycott provisions adopted in Export Adminis-
tration Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No 95-52, tit. II, 91 Stat. 235, 244-48); see also S. REP. No.
169, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1147, 1172.
24. 15 C.F.R. § 769 (1991).
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or imposed by a foreign country against a country that is "friendly to the United
States" and not itself the object of any form of U.S. boycott. 25 Actions prohib-
ited by the regulations consist of:
" refusing to do business with anyone pursuant to an agreement with, require-
ment of, request from, or on behalf of a boycotting country;
26
* refusing to employ or otherwise discriminating against any individual who
is a U.S. person on the basis of that person's race, religion, sex, or national
origin;
27
* furnishing information with respect to the race, religion, sex, or national
origin of any U.S. person;
28
" furnishing information about whether any person has, has had, or proposes
to have any business relationship with or in a boycotted country or with any
person who is known or believed to be restricted from having a business
relationship with or in a boycotting country; 2 9
" furnishing information about whether any person is a member of, has made
contributions to, or is otherwise associated with or involved in the activities
of any charitable organization that supports a boycotted country;30
" paying, honoring, confirming, or otherwise implementing a letter of credit
that contains a boycott-related condition or requirement, compliance with
which is prohibited by the regulations; 3' and
" engaging in any action with intent to evade the regulations or assisting
another person to violate or evade the regulations.32
The term "United States person" is defined to include a domestic concern's
"controlled in fact" foreign subsidiary, partnership, affiliate, branch, office, or
other permanent foreign establishment. 33 An activity in "the interstate or foreign
commerce of the United States" for such an affiliate or branch occurs, in gen-
eral, where (a) the affiliate or branch engages in a transaction with a person
located in the United States3 4 or (b) the affiliate or branch engages in a trans-
action with a person located outside the United States involving goods or services
(including information but not including "ancillary services") acquired from a
person in the United States if (i) the goods or services were acquired by the
affiliate or branch for the purpose of filling an order from a person outside the
United States, (ii) the goods or services were acquired by the affiliate or branch
for incorporation into, refining into, reprocessing into, or the manufacture of
another product for the purpose of filling an order from a person outside the
25. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(a)(1) (1988).
26. Id. app. § 2407(a)(1)(A); 15 C.F.R. § 769.2(a) (1991).
27. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(a)(1)(B); 15 C.F.R. § 769.2(b).
28. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(a)(1)(C); 15 C.F.R. § 769.2(c).
29. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(a)(1)(D); 15 C.F.R. § 769.2(d).
30. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(a)(1)(E); 15 C.F.R. § 769.2(e).
31. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(a)(I)(F); 15 C.F.R. § 769.2(f).
32. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(a)(5); 15 C.F.R. § 769.4.
33. 15 C.F.R. § 769.1(b)(1)(v).
34. Id. § 769.1(d)(6).
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United States, or (iii) the goods or services were acquired by the affiliate or
branch and are ultimately used, without substantial alteration or modification, in
filling an order from or engaging in any other transaction with a person outside
the United States.35
This fairly elaborate jurisdictional scheme is the product of an extensive leg-
islative and regulatory process, much of which revolved around the issue of the
law's extraterritorial reach.36 The extraterritorial prescriptions that eventuated
apply without distinction directly to foreign incorporated and nonincorporated
entities, including branches.
In that regard, the law pays no heed to Restatement section 414's distinction
between foreign branches and foreign subsidiaries. Its extraterritorial application is
limited by obviously complex rules relating to U.S. commerce, the general effect of
which is to constrain the reach of the law to those situations where foreign subsid-
iaries and branches of U.S. corporations have some further nexus with the United
States in addition to their corporate affiliation. In addition, the law contains a com-
plex and important exception permitting compliance by foreign affiliates and
branches in certain circumstances with the law of the host country notwithstanding
conflict with U.S. law.37 Judgments in this context as to reasonableness, limited
purpose, exceptionality, essentiality, and other elements suggested by Restatement
section 414 are so fundamentally subjective in character and so demonstrably the
product of an intense political process that it is difficult to imagine any reasonable
basis upon which judicial jurisdictional determinations in this area could properly be
substituted for those of the legislature and the regulators to whom the legislature has
delegated implementing authority.
38
B. THE INTERNATIONAL Boycor PROVISIONS
OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
The purpose of the international boycott provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code39 (the Code) is to deny certain tax benefits to any U.S. taxpayer or member
of a controlled group (within the meaning of section 993(a)(3) of the Code) that
includes the taxpayer, where such taxpayer or member of such controlled group
35. Id. § 769.1(d)(8).
36. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 190, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 362, 362-63; S. REP. No. 104, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1977) (describing
legislative action over preceding years); Restrictive Trade Practices or Boycotts, Final Rules, 43 Fed.
Reg. 3508, 3508-12 (1978) (describing Commerce Department's responses to extensive public
comments elicited over four-month rulemaking process through advance notice of proposed rule-
making, distribution to interested parties of proposed rules after their publication, and meetings with
concerned persons).
37. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(a)(2)(F); 15 C.F.R. § 769.3(f).
38. The statute directs the President to issue regulations implementing its requirements. 50
U.S.C. app. § 2407(a)(1). Statutory authority has been delegated to the Secretary of Commerce by
Executive Order. Exec. Order No. 12,002, 3 C.F.R. 133 (1978), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403
(1988); Exec. Order No. 12,214, 3 C.F.R. 256 (1981), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403 (1988).
39. I.R.C. §§ 908, 952(a), 995(b)(1), 999 (1988) (originally enacted as Tax Reform Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-455, §§ 1061-1064, 1066-1067, 90 Stat. 1520, 1649-54).
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has participated in or cooperated with an international boycott as defined by the
statute. Section 999 also requires U.S. taxpayers to file reports with the IRS
concerning (i) the taxpayer's operations in or related to a boycotting country,
(ii) the taxpayer's participation in or cooperation with an international boycott,
and (iii) the taxpayer's receipt of requests for such participation or cooperation.
Participation in or cooperation with an international boycott basically consists
of agreeing to refrain from doing business with or in boycotted countries, or with
boycotted companies or individuals, as proscribed by the Code. 40 Application of
the statute to a foreign affiliate of a U.S. entity arises by virtue of the affiliate
being a member of a controlled group (within the meaning of section 993(a)(3)
of the Code) that includes a U.S. taxpayer. 4 1 Thus, the direct mandate is to the
U.S. parent corporation, and, as such, its extraterritorial application would pre-
sumably be subject to the strictures of either section 414(2)(a) or 414(2)(b) of the
Restatement.
While a court possibly could uphold such extraterritorial application on the
basis of section 414(2)(a) alone, since the issue is nominally one of taxation, the
international boycott provisions of the Code are primarily intended to encourage
behavioral change, not to generate or protect federal revenues. As such, section
414(2)(b) analysis would seem more appropriate. Yet a court presented with a
challenge based on section 414(2)(b) would be required to engage in an analysis
as to exceptionality, importance, effectiveness, and conflict that Congress might
be presumed to have undertaken in enacting the international boycott provisions
of the Code in the first instance. It is difficult to see how a court might substitute
its judgment with respect to such matters on any basis that could command
legislative deference to what are inherently subjective judgments.
Section 999's extraterritorial characteristics are not accidental. Section 999 of
the Code is the outgrowth of a complex congressional and executive choreog-
raphy in the mid-1970s that revolved around the perceived threat to U.S. inter-
ests emanating from the Arab oil embargo and the accumulation of enhanced
economic power in the hands of Arab oil-producing states. Congress perceived
that power as threatening U.S. economic and foreign policy interests .42 Part of
the dance involved parallel efforts by way of amendment to the Export Admin-
istration Act to deal with the long-standing Arab boycott against both Israel and
those doing business with Israel. The antiboycott prohibitions and the finely
tuned extraterritoriality provisions that eventually emerged in an amended Ex-
port Administration Act are the product of that parallel effort.43
40. Id. § 999(b)(3) (1988).
41. See id. § 908(a) (reduction of foreign tax credit for member of controlled group); Id. §
999(c)(1) (1988) (computation of international boycott factor for member of controlled group for
purposes of I.R.C. § 952(a) (subpart F income)); id. § 995(b)(1) (deemed DISC distributions); see
also Temp. Treas. Reg. § 7.999-1 (1977).
42. See generally KENNAN L. T"SLIK, CONGRESS, THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND SPECIAL INTER-
ESTS: THE AMERICAN RESPONSE TO THE ARAB BoYcoTT OF ISRAEL (1982).
43. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
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Section 999 reflects in part a deliberate congressional determination to take a
different approach to extraterritoriality under the Internal Revenue Code regard-
less of inconsistencies with the approach then developing under the Export
Administration Act.44 A court that was asked to undo the resulting congressional
antiboycott scheme as reflected in both the Export Administration Act and the
Internal Revenue Code would, in essence, be asked to revisit the complex weigh-
ing, balancing, and political hazard that went into the original legislative pro-
cess. Whether it could find a more reasonable recipe is a matter of speculation.
C. THE FOREIGN POLICY PROVISIONS OF
THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION AcT
The purposes of the foreign policy provisions of the Export Administration
Act 45 are:
* to restrict exports of goods or technology where necessary to further sig-
nificantly the foreign policy of the United States or to fulfill its declared
international obligations;
" to secure the removal by foreign countries of restrictions on access to
supplies where such restrictions have or may have a serious domestic in-
flationary impact, have caused or may cause a serious domestic shortage, or
have been imposed for purposes of influencing the foreign policy of the
United States;
" to encourage other countries to take immediate steps to prevent the use of
their territories or resources to aid, encourage, or give sanctuary to persons
involved in directing, supporting, or participating in acts of international
terrorism; and
" to control the export of goods and substances whose use is banned or
severely restricted in the United States for purposes of public health and
safety in order to prevent injury to U.S. foreign policy as well as the
credibility of the United States as a responsible trading partner.46
The implementing regulations apply to any person who exports goods or
technology from the United States and to any person who reexports from foreign
countries U.S.-origin goods, technical data, or, in some instances, the product of
U.S.-origin technical data. 47 The regulations make no distinction between for-
eign branches and subsidiaries of U.S. companies; both are treated alike. The
regulations also make no distinction between foreign organizations or entities
affiliated with or that are a part of a U.S. entity and foreign entities having no
legal affiliation with entities organized under the laws of the United States.
44. See TESLIK, supra note 42, at 141-45.
45. Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 6, 93 Stat. 503, 513-15 (codified
as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405 (1988 & Supp. 1 1990)).
46. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(a)(1) (referring to congressional declaration of policy at 50 U.S.C.
app. § 2402(2)(B), (7), (8), (13)).
47. See 15 C.F.R. § 770.3(a) (1991) (exports); id. § 774.1 (reexports); id. § 779.8 (technical
data).
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Prescriptive jurisdiction under this regime attaches to anyone who deals in
U.S.-origin goods or technology. This category includes foreign entities that
have no nexus whatsoever by way of ownership control with a U.S. entity. Like
eighteenth century mercantilism, the flag follows the goods.
Whether section 414 of the Restatement is relevant to the extraterritorial reach
of U.S. export control law is an open question, for the matter of export controls
is addressed as a wholly separate subject by section 812 of the Restatement.
Section 812(2) of the Restatement provides as follows: "Under the law of the
United States, the President may, upon making determinations required by stat-
ute, restrict exports to safeguard the national security, to further foreign policy,
to comply with international obligations of the United States, or to conserve
resources in short supply." Absent from section 812 is any notion of reason-
ableness, limited purpose, essentiality, or any of the other touchstones of section
414. Section 812 appears instead to be nothing more than a statement of the
current law in the United States, rather than a prescription as in section 414 of
what the law might or should be in the future. Unfortunately, the Restatement
provides no explanation for its seeming total deference to the existing state of
affairs in this aspect of U.S. foreign relations law. Without doubt, U.S. export
control law and regulation reflects legislative and executive branch consider-
ations of the very kind set forth in section 414(2)(b).
Such deference is all the more curious in light of the export control regime's
applicability to foreign entities whose only connection with the United States is
their possession of U.S.-origin goods or technical data. Perhaps the Restate-
ment's failure to subject export control regulation to section 414-type analysis
reflects an awareness of traditional judicial reluctance to intrude into this arena
and, thus, the pointlessness of suggesting rules of decision-making for evaluating
export control extraterritoriality. If so, it is fair to question why the Restatement
should make such a pronounced bow to the existing state of affairs with respect
to export controls as compared with other forms of national security or foreign
policy based regulations that have less extensive extraterritorial applications.
D. THE NATIONAL SECURITY PROVISIONS
OF THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION Act
The purpose of the national security provisions of the Export Administration
Act 48 is to authorize the President to restrict exports of goods or technology that
would make a significant contribution to the military potential of another country
or set of countries where such contribution would prove detrimental to the
security of the United States.49 Jurisdiction under this regime, as under the
48. Export Administration Act of 1979 § 5, 93 Stat. at 506-13 (codified as amended at 50
U.S.C. app. § 2404).
49. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(a)(1) (referring to congressional declaration of policy at 50
U.S.C. app. § 2402(2)(A)).
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foreign policy based export control regime, generally attaches to anyone who
deals in U.S.-origin goods or technology.50 Whether section 414 of the Restate-
ment is relevant is also an open question in light of section 812 of the Restate-
ment that suggests no limitation on the extraterritorial reach of prescriptive
jurisdiction with respect to export control matters.
Export controls may not be effective, however, if those who acquired U.S.-
origin goods that were originally exported from the United States subject to
certain national security based conditions with respect to their ultimate destina-
tion and use were able to disregard those restrictions. Yet there have been in-
stances, such as the 1982 Soviet pipeline sanctions, that suggest the relevance of
some of the factors listed in section 414, such as conflict with the law or policy
of other states, to the development of an orderly international legal environment
in this area.5 1 Here again, the Restatement's lack of explanation for section 812's
unqualified deference to the existing state of affairs under U.S. practice is cu-
rious. Perhaps, as suggested at the outset, this is an example of the unresolved
tension within the Restatement as to a rule reflecting "development in the law as
given effect by United States courts" 52 and "the opinion of the American Law
Institute as to the rules that an impartial tribunal would apply if charged with
deciding a controversy in accordance with international law."
53
E. THE INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY ECONOMIC POWERS ACT (IEEPA)
AND THE TRADING WITH THE ENEMY ACT (TWEA)
The purposes of IEEPA54 and its predecessor, TWEA,55 are to give the Pres-
ident wide-ranging powers to deal quickly and flexibly with international crises
that pose a threat to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the
United States sufficient to justify the declaration of a national emergency.56
Pursuant to IEEPA and its TWEA predecessor, the U.S. Treasury Department
has promulgated regulations under delegations of authority from the President
imposing economic sanctions on North Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, Cuba, Iran,
Nicaragua, Libya, Panama, and Iraq, among others.
57
50. See sources cited supra note 47.
51. The pipeline sanctions are considered in the reporters' notes to both section 414 and section
812. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 414 reporters' note 8; id. § 812 reporters' note 2.
52. Id. pt. IV introductory note at 231.
53. Id. introduction at 3.
54. International Emergency Economic Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, §§ 201-208, 91 Stat.
1626-29 (1977) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-06 (1988)).
55. Trading with the Enemy Act, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411 (1917) (codified as amended at 50
U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (1988)).
56. See 50 U.S.C. § 1701; id. app. §§ 3, 5.
57. See, e.g., Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 500 (1990) (North Korea,
Vietnam and Cambodia); Cuban Assets Control Regulations, id. § 515; Iranian Assets Control
Regulations, id. § 535; Nicaraguan Trade Control Regulations, id. § 540; Libyan Sanctions Regu-
lations, id. § 550; Panamanian Transactions Regulations, id. § 565; Iraqi Sanctions Regulations, 56
Fed. Reg. 2112 (1991) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 575).
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The prescriptive extraterritorial reach of these regulations varies. For example,
the Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 58 which apply to dealings with Vietnam,
Cambodia, and North Korea, and the Cuban Assets Control Regulations,
59
which apply to dealings with Cuba, apply to "person[s] subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the United States" and "person[s] within the United States."6 Those
terms are defined to include (1) "[a]ny corporation, partnership or association,
wherever organized or doing business, that is owned or controlled" by any
individual U.S. citizen or resident, 6 1 (2) "[a]ny person actually within the
United States, ' 62 or (3) "[a]ny corporation organized under the laws of the
United States. ' 63 The terms "owned" or "controlled" are not defined, how-
ever, and are used in the disjunctive so that either ownership (undefined) by a
U.S. entity or citizen or control (undefined) by a U.S. entity or citizen is suffi-
cient to subject a foreign entity to U.S. jurisdiction. The Libyan Sanctions
Regulations, 64 by contrast, are somewhat more limited in their extraterritorial
reach in that they apply generally only to "U.S. persons'' 65 (which includes
foreign branches of U.S. entities, but not their foreign subsidiaries) and do not
apply in general to exports of products other than from the United States. 66
Similar limitations on extraterritorial reach appeared in the Panamanian Trans-
actions Regulations. 67
Thus, the extraterritorial reach of regulations promulgated pursuant to IEEPA
and TWEA vary considerably, reflecting, at least in the case of the Libyan
Sanctions Regulations, a probable reluctance to impinge upon the economic
behavior of foreign entities in situations where U.S. foreign policy toward Libya
may not be fully embraced by their host countries. 68 A court is unlikely to feel
competent on the basis of section 414 or otherwise to substitute its judgment on
these matters for that of the President of the United States or his delegates.
58. Id. § 500.
59. Id. § 515.
60. Id. § 500.201 (Foreign Assets Control Regulations); id. § 515.201 (Cuban Assets Control
Regulations).
61. Id. § 500.329(d) (Foreign Assets Control Regulations); id. § 515.329(d) (Cuban Assets
Control Regulations) (emphasis added).
62. Id. § 500.330(2) (Foreign Assets Control Regulations); id. § 515.330(2) (Cuban Assets
Control Regulations).
63. Id. §§ 500.329(c), .330(3) (Foreign Assets Control Regulations); id. §§ 515.329(c), .330(3)
(Cuban Assets Control Regulations).
64. Id. § 550 (1990).
65. Id. §§ 550.204-207, .209(a); see also id. § 550.203.
66. In the Libyan Sanctions Regulations, the term "United States person" is defined to mean
'any United States citizen, permanent resident alien, juridical person organized under the laws of the
United States, or any person in the United States." Id. § 550.308 (emphasis added). The export
prohibition is limited, however, to exports "to Libya from the United States." Id. § 550.202
(emphasis added).
67. See id. § 565.307 (defining U.S. person).
68. Similarly, the Cuban Assets Control Regulations contain an exception permitting compliance
with host country policy in favor of trade with Cuba. See id. § 515.559.
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Judicial deference to the legislative or executive branches in this area should
not be any less pronounced than it is in the traditional export control arena,
where, as indicated, the Restatement appears to admit of no potential for judicial
review. Even if a court were inclined to undertake its own assessment of extra-
territoriality in this area, the most it could do would be to weigh the consider-
ations set forth in section 414. At the same time, it would have no principled
basis for concluding that its weighing of section 414's factors carried any more
legitimacy than the weighing done by those in the executive branch charged with
responsibility for carrying out the President's foreign policy directives.
F. THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICEs AcT
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 197769 (FCPA) has essentially two
purposes. The first is to require issuers of securities subject to the registration and
reporting requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) to:
(A) make and keep books, records and accounts that, in reasonable detail, accurately
and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer; and
(B) devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide
reasonable assurances that-
(i) transactions are executed in accordance with management's . . . authorization;
(ii) transactions are recorded as necessary (I) to permit preparation of financial
statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles .... and
(II) to maintain accountability for assets;
(iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with management's . . .
authorization; and
(iv) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with existing assets at
reasonable intervals and appropriate action is taken with respect to any differences. 70
The second principal purpose of the FCPA is to prohibit 1934 Act issuers, as
well as domestic concerns, from (i) authorizing the payment of, promising to
pay, or paying anything of value to any foreign official for purposes of influ-
encing any official act or decision in order to obtain or retain business or
(ii) authorizing or promising the payment of or paying anything of value to
anyone else while knowing that such person will make a payment to a foreign
official for purposes of obtaining or retaining business.
7 1
The FCPA is not a foreign policy or national security based statute. Yet its
genesis derived from a concern over the foreign relations aspects of the Lockheed
scandal in the 1970s involving allegations of bribes to Japanese government
officials. 72 Indeed, revelations of bribes made to high-level government officials
69. Pub. L. No. 95-213, tit. I, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (codified as amended in the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (1988)).
70. Id. § 102, 91 Stat. at 1494 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)).
71. See id. § 30A(a), 91 Stat. at 1495 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a)) (1934 Act issuers);
see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2 (other domestic concerns).
72. See S. REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-4 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4098, 4099-4101.
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in Japan ultimately resulted in the downfall of the Tanaka government at a time
when that government was important to a number of U.S. foreign policy goals
in the Far East.
The FCPA does not expressly apply to foreign affiliates. In certain circum-
stances, however, a U.S. parent corporation can be liable for the acts of its
foreign subsidiary if, for example, the foreign subsidiary is treated as an agent of
its U.S. parent in making a corrupt payment or is regarded as having been
authorized by its parent to make a corrupt payment. Authorization could take the
form of a failure to adopt adequate internal controls against corrupt payments.
The U.S. parent corporation may also be liable for the acts of its foreign
subsidiary if the parent fails to ensure that the foreign subsidiary maintains
accurate books and records. In addition, a foreign corporation that has no affil-
iation with a corporation in the United States, whether as the parent of a U.S.
subsidiary or the foreign subsidiary of a U.S. parent, can be liable under the
FCPA simply because it is an issuer of securities for purposes of the 1934 Act.
Thus, there are numerous circumstances in which the FCPA directly prescribes
the behavior of foreign entities either because they might be regarded as agents
of their U.S. parent or affiliate or because they are subject to the registration and
reporting requirements of the 1934 Act.
The books and records provisions of the FCPA, insofar as they apply to foreign
subsidiaries of U.S. corporations due to the U.S. corporation's status as an issuer
of securities under the 1934 Act, might properly be regarded as an example of a
section 414(2)(a) exercise of jurisdiction necessary to achieve uniformity of
accounting and consistency of disclosure to investors. But the same cannot be
said about the application of the books and records provisions to foreign corpo-
rations that have no affiliation with U.S. corporate entities or whose affiliation is
a parent-subsidiary relationship. In those instances, jurisdiction is predicated
solely on the status of a foreign issuer of securities under the 1934 Act, not the
presence of a U.S. parent-foreign subsidiary or other intercorporate relationship.
On its face, section 414 appears irrelevant to such situations, since there is no
U.S. corporate entity to establish a jurisdictional predicate in those circum-
stances. Section 414 similarly appears irrelevant to the FCPA's antibribery pro-
visions in such circumstances.
With respect to foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations, on the other hand,
section 414(2)(a) would seem to preclude the application of the FCPA's antibrib-
ery proscriptions since such proscriptions do not, by virtue of distinctions made
by the FCPA and otherwise, appear to come within section 414(2)(a)'s account-
ing, tax, and disclosure universe. Tested under section 414(2)(b), the FCPA's
antibribery provisions present difficult issues of fact and judgment as to which
one can reasonably assume a court would be reluctant to substitute its judgment
for that of the legislature.
Particularly nettlesome is the fact that one of the principal motivations for the
legislation was to prescribe standards of behavior with respect to conduct that
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takes place abroad in environments that generally condone or ignore bribery. In
that sense, Congress intended the legislation as a direct challenge to business
practices that might be acceptable in foreign countries. Under those circum-
stances, a court might reasonably conclude that the FCPA's proscriptions with
respect to standards of business behavior abroad are in conflict with the policy of
a particular foreign jurisdiction. At the same time, it would undoubtedly feel
constraints on invalidating a deliberate congressional determination to ignore and
indeed confront such conflicts, since the presence of conflict was the predicate
for the legislative prescription in the first instance. 73 Since Congress can rea-
sonably be viewed as having deliberately weighed considerations of the type set
forth in section 414(2)(b), it is difficult to see how a court could substitute its
own contrary judgment on such matters. The FCPA, like iterations of the national
security, foreign policy, and foreign boycott provisions of the Export Adminis-
tration Act, is not accidental in its extraterritorial characteristics.
III. Upsetting Legislative and Executive Delineations
In the national policy and foreign policy spheres, Congress and the executive
branch have made numerous and often complex jurisdictional delineations in
prescribing conduct abroad that they perceived to have ramifications for U.S.
interests. At one end of the spectrum are the economic sanctions regulations
promulgated pursuant to IEEPA or TWEA and the Export Administration Reg-
ulations promulgated pursuant to the Export Administration Act. While in many
respects these regulations reflect aggressive and somewhat simplistic extraterri-
torial applications of U.S. law, they also appear to reflect reasoned judgments
about the extent to which extraterritorial application is necessary to the achieve-
ment of legislative or regulatory goals despite actual or potential conflicts with
foreign law or policy. For example, despite their broad extraterritorial reach, the
express exception in the Cuban Assets Control Regulations for compliance with
host country policy, and the distinction under the Libyan Sanctions Regulations
between foreign subsidiaries and foreign branches and exports from the United
States and exports from abroad, appear to reflect conscious policy choices about
the appropriate extraterritorial reach of U.S. law in each instance, presumably in
light of factors of the kind delineated in section 414.
At the other end of the spectrum, the foreign boycott provisions of the Export
Administration Regulations reflect a more sophisticated and complex array of
jurisdictional considerations as embodied in their definitions of "U.S. person"
and "U.S. commerce" that demonstrably are the product of heightened sensi-
73. The FCPA goes some way toward accommodating foreign custom by providing an exception
for payments expediting routine governmental action and an affirmative defense for actions permitted
under the written laws of the foreign country. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 30A(b), (c)(1), 15
U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(b), (c)(1) (1934 Act issuers); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(b), (c)(1) (other domestic
concerns).
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tivities about unwarranted intrusions on the sovereignty and interests of others. 74
The so-called local law exception, which under certain circumstances permits
U.S. persons even with respect to their activities in U.S. commerce to comply
with host country law,75 reflects a deliberate effort to accommodate host country
law where the conflict with U.S. law would be acute. Bodies of law such as the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, on the other hand, are deliberately intended to
confront conflicting practices in foreign countries to the extent not expressly
sanctioned by host country law. Conflict with foreign law in these instances is a
challenge that Congress knowingly and willingly embraced.
While jurisdictional lines in each of these instances could have been drawn
differently, especially in the face of conflict with host country policy or law, no
intuitively or empirically correct alternative is readily apparent. In most in-
stances, the legislative or regulatory history will reflect legislative and executive
struggles to determine whether extraterritorial application is essential to further
a major national interest and whether there are less intrusive alternatives. In most
instances, too, legislative or regulatory history will reflect efforts to reduce or
minimize conflicts with the laws or policy of a foreign subsidiary's host state.
Even where the presence of such considerations may not be apparent, how-
ever, there is little to support a judicial preference for jurisdictional lines other
than those that Congress or the executive have drawn unless, perhaps, the po-
litical branches are reckless in their disregard of reasonableness. For example,
while some may quarrel with a law that requires foreign affiliates of U.S. com-
panies to refrain from making payments to foreign government officials where
the absence of such payments virtually guarantees that business will be directed
to competitors, there is little, if any, basis for preferring a judicial as compared
to a legislative determination about the essentiality of applying the FCPA to
foreign subsidiaries from the standpoint of the national interest. By the same
token, there is little, if any, basis for preferring a judicial over a legislative
determination that such conflicts with foreign country policy or practice as might
arise under the FCPA are tolerable or acceptable under all relevant circum-
stances.
Inevitably, Restatement section 414 can at most provide guidance to the po-
litical branches of government in a search for the reasonable. In the national
security and foreign relations arena, the judiciary must inevitably accept the
judgments that ensue. Restatement 414 is not, however, to be regarded as in-
consequential. On the contrary, it makes a substantial contribution to the effort
to establish norms of civilized behavior in a world where the potential for legal
conflict is great and likely to grow. As such, it is an important building block in
the quest for supremacy of the rule of law.
74. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 104, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 22-24 (1977).
75. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(a)(2)(F) (1988); 15 C.F.R. § 769.3(f) (1991); see also S. REP.
No. 104, supra note 74, at 45-46.
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